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This study is part of a large body of research on the incentives to innovate
in durable goods industries. In most of the existing formulations, the decision to
invest in research and development is driven by the prospect of monopoly pro￿ts on
the incremental value that the new vintages provide. Thus, in much of the existing
literature, innovation goes hand-in-hand with value creation.
In this paper, I reexamine the manufacturers￿incentives assuming that the mere
introduction of new vintages a⁄ects the usage value of all vintages previously sold.
In particular, I study a standard durable good pricing model in which a monopolist
has the option, at the beginning of each period, to destroy1 the usage value of
all units previously sold and simultaneously introduce a new, perhaps improved,
vintage at some cost c ￿ 0, a practice which I refer to as "destructive creation".
Such cost is interpreted as any expenditure incurred in the process of destruction
as well as in the process of creating, developing and marketing the new versions. In
equilibrium innovation cycles of ￿nite length, consisting in the periodic introduction
of successive, non-overlapping vintages arise. In this framework I address three basic
questions. First, how do the incentives to innovate a⁄ect the equilibrium prices and
sales? Second, is this practice desirable from a pro￿t maximizing perspective? Since
rational consumers anticipate opportunistic behavior and adjust their willingness to
pay accordingly, manufacturers may actually want to build a reputation for not
doing this kind of things. And third, what are the welfare consequences?
By allowing innovation to a⁄ect the value of the existing stock of durable goods,
we highlight the role of destruction rather than creation in driving innovative ac-
tivity. The formal analysis shows that destructive creation unambiguously leads to
higher pro￿ts whatever the innovation cost. On second thought this shouldn￿ t come
as a surprise. If the ￿problem￿ , from a pro￿t maximizing perspective, is the dura-
bility of the output then it follows that any (cheap enough) mechanism that reduces
or eliminates it would put the monopolist in a stronger position (i.e. ￿closer￿to the
rental outcome). The power to ￿wreck￿the value of old versions of a product ends
up serving much the same purpose and hence the pro￿t restoral.
This result comes with important strings attached, due to the fact that new
introductions are always determined ex-post. This distinctive feature of this mecha-
nism generates a link between market prices and consumers expectations: the price
itself a⁄ects the willingness to pay for it. The reason is that the incentives to inno-
vate depend on the existing stock of durable. Thus current sales a⁄ect the expected
duration of the good. In equilibrium a unique continuation pro￿le is associated to
1The assumption of full destruction is made for expositional convenience. One can allow for
partial destruction as long as destruction is anyway signi￿cant.
1every price such that the higher the price for the current vintage, the farther away
innovation and thus the higher the willingness to pay. Manufacturers are shown to
sometimes exploit this linkage to extract higher rents.
Finally welfare e⁄ects are in general ambiguous both for consumers and for
aggregate e¢ ciency. The analysis shows that remedies aiming at increasing the cost
of destructive creation, and thus at discouraging its practice, can back￿re. They can
lead to an increase in the discounted amount of resources invested in the practice
and/or to distortion of the equilibrium prices (thus a⁄ecting consumers￿surplus).
This result is particularly intriguing since it holds even if the new vintages are not
of increased value.
Crucial in the analysis is the role of destruction. One of the primary ways in
which it can be accomplished is through product design or restrictive aftermarket
practices. For instance software writers usually limit backward compatibility while
manufacturers usually cease after a while to supply essential after-sales services or
spare parts for their old products. Examples and applications include aftermarket
practices that hinder prolonged usage;2 excessive add-on pricing;3 markets char-
acterized by network externalities and/or compatibility issues;4 standard setting;
social consumption.5 Kodak, Prime Computer, Data General, Unisys and Xerox,
for example, have been repeadetly alleged of monopolizing the maintenance market
refusing to deal with independent service organizations (ISOs). In fact Borenstein
et al (1995; pp. 470) argue that in some of these classic court cases was presented
"...evidence that manufacturers introduce price increases for parts and
service on old equipment -or refuse to service old models altogether-
speci￿cally to induce customers to migrate to a newer model."
More recently Microsoft, contextually to the launch of its new O.S. Vista, has
discontinued the provision of security support for older versions as part of its "Life
Cycle Support Policy", forcing customers still running these old editions (actually
millions) to upgrade.6 Similarly Turbine Ent., the publisher of Asheron￿ s Call 2, a
2e.g., prohibitive maintenance, repair, consumables, spare parts prices; discontinued provision
of essential complementary services such as security updates (OSs, antiviruses) or on-line platforms
(video games, e-services).
3High add-on prices may be interpreted as a mean to encourage customers to migrate to newer,
perhaps richer models.
4e.g. software upgrades, textbooks revisions, consumer electronics.
5e.g., fashion clothes (Pesendorfer 1996), conspicuous consumption (Bagwell and Bernheim
1996), prosocial behavior (Benabou and Tirole 2006).
6Windows Vista was originally promised for the second half of 2006. Ef-
fective July 11, 2006, Windows 98, Windows 98 Second Edition, and Windows
Me (and their related components) have transitioned to a non-supported status
(http://www.microsoft.com/windows/support/endofsupport.mspx). In December 2005, 22%
of Pc Users were still running Windows 98/ME according to Elizabeth Montalbano￿ s "Older
Windows OS Users: Kiss Tech Support Good-Bye"; Thursday, April 13, 2006; www.pcworld.com.
2popular multiplayer on-line game has recently shutdown its servers (thus actually
"killing" thousands of virtual characters) as a reaction to tepid sales of their lat-
est expansion packs. Despite many remonstrances (that sometimes degenerated in
"virtual" but otherwise real in-game riots), the publisher did not make any e⁄ort to
commit to prolonged service or to guarantee some sort of backward compatibility.7
As a byproduct, the model is thus able to explain in a uni￿ed manner a number
of business practices related to secondary markets which have a long history of
scrutiny under the antitrust laws but which have been seldomly related both in
theory and in practice. The plainti⁄s￿arguments in most cases relied either on some
sort of leverage theory (for ￿rms with substantial market power in the primary
market) or on the lack of commitment power (or imperfect contractibilities) that
prevented competitive pressure in the primary market from restoring cost based
pricing in the aftermarkets. This research instead interprets these practice as a
mean of encouraging customers migrating to newer models. High spare parts prices
are not meant to be paid but to be avoided through substitution. It thus gives an
additional reason for monopolizing aftermarkets even when the seller has substantial
market power in the primary market which does not rely on any leverage hypothesis.
Interestingly, experimental evidence suggests that destruction can also be ob-
tained through marketing techniques. For instance, Okada (2001) shows that trade-
in pricing, gift opportunities, and low external reference prices signi￿cantly increase
the likelihood of replacement of old vintages with new ones by negatively a⁄ecting
the perceived residual value of the old products.
Lastly theoretical applications of destructive creation also include Schumpeterian
growth models i.e., endogenous growth models in which whoever succeeds in the
R&D race reaps the full monopoly pro￿ts "as if" the value of the previous (lower
quality) goods were completely destroyed (e. g. Aghion and Howitt 1992).8
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main ingredients
and solves the so called "Shutdown Game", establishing the conditions under which
a monopolist will continue to sell an "older" version when he can instead opt out of
the market, (i.e. shutdown) and receive a reward s ￿ 0. The fact that the buyers￿
valuation of the good is endogenous (it depends on how long the seller stays on the
market before shutting down) raises issues related to the existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium which di⁄er from the ones discussed in classic intertemporal price
7"The end is virtually nigh", The Economist, 12/10/2005, Vol. 377, Issue 8456, Special Section
pp14.
8Consumers￿expectations of future "destruction" are typically neglected in these models. This
is because the monopolist￿ s good is either assumed to be a consumption good or to be a durable
(capital) good that is rented rather than sold. However since US vs United Shoe machinery corp., the
courts have declared the latter policy illegal when employed by a monopolist such as a patent holder.
The fact that rational consumers anticipate "destruction" then ends up a⁄ecting the incentives to
innovate which are crucial in these models.
3discrimination models.9 Section 3 (the Innovation Game) endogenizes the outside
option s which is de￿ned as the continuation value of the game following an "empty"
innovation net of the future R&D ￿xed cost. Section 4 extends the positive analysis
by considering a broader equilibrium concept. The latter gives rise to interesting
additional equilibria labeled "innovation traps" and "cycling cycles" whose main
characteristic is that the value of a particular vintage depends directly on calendar
time. Section 5 discusses welfare. It also discusses to what extent the mere intro-
duction of superior products can be interpreted as a means of destroying the value
of previous versions. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented in appendix.
Related literature Since consumers are heterogeneous this model combines
standard intertemporal price discrimination and obsolescence. This article is thus
related to the seminal papers of Waldman (1993), Choi (1993), Waldman (1996)
and Fishman and Rob (2000)10 on new product introductions and to the subse-
quent debate prompted by these works. The ￿rst two articles, like this one, are
concerned with the e⁄ects of new destructive product introductions. In both pa-
pers the combination of incompatibility between successive product generations and
network externalities generates a destructive e⁄ect, since, in equilibrium, as more
and more consumers upgrade, the value of the old product decreases. Waldman
(1996) and Fishman and Rob (2000) instead study the monopolist￿ s incentives to
introduce a superior product in a later period. However, all these works abstract
away from Coasian issues assuming either non-overlapping cohorts of homogeneous
consumers or high heterogeneity11 and hence they don￿ t look at the interplay be-
tween introduction policies and Coasian dynamics. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998),
Lee and Lee (1998) and Nahm (2004) relax the assumption of homogeneous con-
sumers and present a two period model of technological innovation. Neither article
captures the e⁄ects described here for reasons discussed at the end of section 4. Hen-
del and Lizzeri (1999) and Morita and Waldman (2004) propose a model in which
a monopolist can a⁄ect the value of used units restricting consumers￿abilities to
maintain the good. The former article assumes away Coasian dynamics12 and iden-
ti￿es an additional reason for why a seller may still want to a⁄ect the value of used
units. Since consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality and used goods
are imperfect substitutes of new goods, by controlling the rate at which goods dete-
riorate though both product design and restrictive aftermarket practices the seller
can segment the market in used unit users and new unit users. Morita and Waldman
(2004) instead relate aftermarket practices to Coasian dynamics. They present a
9E.g. Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986).
10These papers in turn build on Coase (1972) and Bulow (1982, 1986)
11In Waldman (1996) there is only one "type" whose valuation exceeds the marginal cost of
production.
12The seller can commit to an output plan at the beginning of the game.
4two-period model of a market in which durable goods naturally deteriorate13 (i.e.
destruction is assumed), and the seller can costlessly14 restore the value of used
units say, by allowing for competition in aftermarkets. When the scrap value of an
used unit is higher than the consumption value their model can be interpreted as
a model of destructive creation with c = 0 since destroying on purpose is equiva-
lent to not restoring on purpose. The two models are complementary since Morita
and Waldman assume destruction (or that destruction is costless) and vary the rate
at which the durable goods deteriorate while I assume that the old versions are
worthless if destroyed and let the cost of doing so vary. This distinction is crucial.
Varying the cost of destruction generates the intertemporal con￿ ict that constitutes
the core of this paper. In contrast Morita and Waldman￿ s results would not change
if the monopolist could commit at the beginning of the game to a behavior in the
aftermarket. Furthermore all these analyses do not investigate the properties of the
resulting cycles as they typically study a ￿nite, two-period model.
Pesendorfer (1996) illustrates an interesting mechanism by which the introduc-
tion of new "styles" of no additional value destroys the value of the previous ones.15
In his model a matching market that sorts people by the fashion they use creates
a signaling/screening role of consumption. As "high" types upgrade to new, more
exclusive products the value of the old product decreases.16 This paper takes the
destructive mechanism as given (i.e. endows the seller with a destructive wand) and
investigates issues related to its optimal employment and to its performance relative
to other means to ￿ght the Coasian inclination to lower prices over time.
Finally this paper is also related to models of cyclic pricing such as Conlisk et
al. (1984) and Sobel (1991). In this model sales (or recurrent periods of low prices)
occur over time as consumers anticipate opportunistic behavior and are thus willing
to pay less for goods expected to be destroyed sometime soon.
II. The Shutdown Game
The elements of the formal model are as follows. A Seller has an in￿nite number
of units for sale. Storage is costless and the Seller derives no utility from having





with b > 0 who derive a positive utility, in a way discussed below,
from consumption. The Seller cannot discriminate among di⁄erent buyers but it
13Used, non maintained, units are less productive than new or maintained units.
14They assume that units costs of maintenance are su¢ ciently low so that used units are always
restored at the competitive price.
15The astute reader should have noticed that I￿ ve already celebrated Pesendorfer￿ s intuition in
the opening including "fashions" and signal provision as potential applications and examples of
destructive creation.
16By the same logic any model of (dynamic) signal provision is a model of destructive creation
as long as the introduction of new signals a⁄ects the (equilibrium) value of the signals already sold.
5is common knowledge that b is a random variable i:i:d: across consumers with a





Time is indexed by periods t = 1;2;:::;1 and ￿ < 1 is a common discount factor.
At the beginning of each period the monopolist can either continue to serve the
residual demand and hence propose a price pt or shut down. When the latter option
is preferred the game ends and the monopolist obtains s ￿ 0. Buyers, right after
purchasing, derive a per period utility b in every period before shut down occurs.
I will refer to the number of sale￿ s periods before shut down in equilibrium as the
(residual) "length of the game".
Assume that the monopolist shuts down in period T +1 and hence let T denote




￿i￿tb ￿ pt: (1)
Each Buyer maximizes his expected utility while the Seller maximizes the ex-
pected present value of its revenue stream. A behavior strategy for the Seller is
a mapping from histories to probability distributions over shutdown decisions and
prices whereas a pure strategy for a buyer is a mapping from those histories in
which he didn￿ t purchase to purchase decisions.18 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of this game is a pair of strategies and a set of beliefs satisfying the usual optimality
conditions and Bayes rule. As we shall see the case s = 0 raises additional issues.
To avoid them in what follows I assume that there is an epsilon sunk cost that
should be paid to provide an extra period of durability. This guarantees that the
monopolist always shutdowns in every subgame in which he has already sold one
unit to everybody. The case s = 0 is postponed to section 4 as an extension.
Let us initially consider the situation where the Seller can commit, at the begin-
ning of the game, to any time path of prices and shutdown policy. The associated
payo⁄ constitutes an upperbound on what the seller can extract and therefore a
natural benchmark.
Proposition 1 The optimal precommitment strategy is to charge a ￿xed price equal
to the (static) monopoly price and to never shutdown as long as the shutdown reward
is lower or equal than the associated pro￿ts and to shutdown immediately otherwise.
17Formally, I assume that the cumulative distribution function is di⁄erentiable and has a di⁄er-
entiable inverse.
18Lastly, I assume that the equilibrium actions of each agent are constant on histories in which
prices are the same and the sets of agents accepting at each point of time di⁄ers at most by sets of
measure 0, which is a natural requirement in all intertemporal price discrimination models (a good
discussion of this issue can be found in Gul et al. 1986, note 6.2).
6The precommitment payo⁄ in case of permanent service is given by
￿fc(￿) = [1 ￿ F(pfc(1 ￿ ￿))]pfc;
where pfc is any optimal precommitment price. Such payo⁄ equals the "rental
solution" of a standard durable good model where a buyer b gets utility b=(1 ￿ ￿)
upon purchasing. It can hence be rewritten as maxr [1 ￿ F(r)]r=(1￿￿) where r is the
rental price. Committing to permanent service maximizes all buyers￿willingness to
pay as it removes concerns over durability. At the same time a ￿xed price strategy
permits to restore market power as it removes cheaper substitutes in the future.
Yet, if the outside option s is greater than the resulting pro￿ts, the Seller would
trivially stay out of the market and cash s. That shutdown in ￿nite time cannot
be optimal follows from the fact that the full commitment payo⁄ coincides with the
rental solution. As the problem of whether to rent or shutdown is clearly stationary
then the monopoly either rents every period or never rents.
Let us now turn to the equilibrium analysis, absent any commitment power. The
fact that the value of the good depends positively on how long the seller stays raises
issues related to the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. An important one is
that multiplicity could arise due to self-ful￿lling expectations of the form: the higher
the expected durability, the higher the willingness to pay, the lower the incentive
to actually shutdown. Another concern is whether shutdown always occurs in ￿nite
time in any equilibrium. The following lemma establishes that any equilibrium
should be characterized by negotiations of ￿nite nature.
Lemma 1 If s ￿ 0 then shutdown always occurs in ￿nite time.
Starting from the "last period of sales" is then possible to "work backwards"
to construct an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium exists and is unique. Furthermore
(i) There exists a ￿nite, decreasing sequence of outside options fsn(￿)gn such that,
in equilibrium, if s 2 (sn+1(￿);sn(￿)) then there will be n periods of sales before
shutdown whereas for s = sn+1(￿) there will be either n or n + 1 periods of
sales depending on the seller￿ s initial choice.
(ii) The monopolist enters (i.e. makes at least one o⁄er before shutting down
operations) if and only if the shutdown reward is less than the full commitment
pro￿ts.
As in standard intertemporal price discrimination models, the consumers￿set
in every t will be partitioned in two, possibly empty, convex and disjoint subsets:
7owners and not owners. De￿ne as bt the owner with the lowest valuation at time t.19
To see that expectations over durability cannot self-ful￿ll, let e b1(s) be the level of
bt (or residual demand) that makes the seller indi⁄erent between staying one more
period or not in the last period of sales (i.e. given that shutdown occurs tomorrow
with probability one). The key to the proof is that for any history such that bt <
e b1(s) in any equilibrium the seller must shutdown with probability one. Suppose
that this is not the case. By lemma 1 a last period always exists in this continuation
game and, by de￿nition of e b1(s), the seller will always shutdown before any such
last period, a contradiction. Given such termination condition the proof proceeds by
inductive hypothesis on bt employing a dominance argument. It analogously de￿nes
a unique sequence of thresholds fe bn(s)g such that the (continuation) equilibrium is
characterized by shutdown after at most n ￿ 1 periods of sales whenever bt < e bn.
Because the monopolist always sells to everybody in a ￿nite number of periods the
induction should eventually stop and therefore an equilibrium exists. Uniqueness is
then established up to the seller initial choice. To any ￿rst period price is associated a
unique sequence of o⁄ers by the seller and acceptance decisions by the buyers. Since
the program need not be convex, it can be the case that the seller is indi⁄erent
between two (or more) ￿rst period prices. The monopolist therefore "selects" the
equilibrium path through his initial choice.
Corollary (i) characterizes the relationship between the equilibrium durability
and the outside option. Intuitively an higher s, ceteris paribus, increases the temp-
tation to shutdown and therefore weakly reduces the equilibrium durability. The
latter part of the statement accounts for the possibility that b is exactly equal to
e bn(s) for some n. If this is the case then also the equilibrium length depends on the
seller￿ s initial choice as, by de￿nition, e bn(s) leaves the seller indi⁄erent between n
or n ￿ 1 periods of sales.
Let ￿(￿;s) denote the (discounted) equilibrium pro￿ts, which is a well de￿ned,
continuous function by proposition 2. (ii) implies that the equilibrium pro￿ts are
always greater than s whenever s < ￿fc and are always equal to s otherwise, a
property which will be useful later on.
Since in section 3 s is interpreted as the net value of an innovation, it remains
to be established whether the equilibrium pro￿ts increase with s. Also, whether
there is any con￿ ict between what the seller would like to commit to and what
he ends up doing in equilibrium. Interestingly the answer to both questions is no,
not necessarily. The fact that the pro￿ts can indeed decrease with s is somewhat
surprising. One would have conjectured that a higher outside option would have
19Intuitively as the game advances bt weakly declines towards b since more and more consumers
join the owners group. In the remaining part of the paper I will improperly refer to bt as the
"residual demand".
8put the seller in a "stronger" position. If the pro￿ts are not increasing in s, then the
value of the outside option, de￿ned as ￿(￿;s)￿ ￿(￿;0), could be negative as well: it
can be advantageous, ex-ante, to "drop" an outside opportunity whenever o⁄ered
one. In order to build the intuition behind these results, I turn to the analysis of
a simple, well-behaved two period game. In light of proposition 2 this two-period
illustration can be interpreted as the actual equilibrium of a game in which the
support is "narrow enough".
A. A two-period illustration
Consider a simple (and rather sad) world inhabited by a seller whose output,
lasts no more than two periods. At the beginning of each period t = 1;2, the seller
can propose a price that all buyers evaluate or cash s ￿ 0 and leave the market.
When the latter option is chosen the game ends and the value of all units previously
sold, if any, is destroyed. If shutdown has not previously occurred, it will occur at t =
3 with probability one. To simplify the exposition assume also, in this illustration,
that there is enough concavity in the problem that equilibrium prices are unique for
almost every s20 and consider those cases in which the maxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r > b.21 If
b is (relatively) low enough then, by virtue of proposition 2, an equilibrium exists
and is unique. It is worth considering here two di⁄erent cases: in the ￿rst case the
monopolist can commit to shutdown at any time T +1 2 f1;2;3g (or can guarantee
any "durability" T he wants) although he cannot pledge himself to predetermined
prices, whereas in the second case he is unable to do so.
Commitment on duration.￿ Under commitment, the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts
can be trivially decomposed in two parts: the discounted sum of the per period
revenues and the discounted shutdown reward, as the amount of the latter does not
a⁄ect the equilibrium prices. Consider ￿rstly the impact of increased durability,
say from one to two periods, on the buyers￿willingness to pay and therefore on the
equilibrium revenues. First, increased durability raises the utility that all buyers get
upon purchase in period 1 (durability e⁄ect). On the contrary, the seller￿ s inability
to commit to future prices creates a cheaper substitute in the future and hence,
all things being equal, this reduces their willingness to pay (Coasian e⁄ect).22 The
former e⁄ect always dominates the latter and therefore postponing shutdown always
20A rectangular distribution would guarantee this. Later on it will be clear what "almost" means
in this context.
21This condition restricts the analysis to non-trivial cases in which the seller can pro￿tably
exercise his market power.
22The presence of a Coasian e⁄ect is the main di⁄erence between this case and the full commit-
ment case. Under full commitment, deferring shutdown increases the value of sales by a factor of
￿
T whereas here the value of sales increases less due to the seller￿ s dynamic inconsistency.
9increases revenues despite the seller￿ s dynamic inconsistency.23 To see this, consider
the ￿rst period of sales. The indi⁄erent buyer b between purchasing today at price
p or tomorrow at some price p2 in the two-period game (i.e. the game where the
seller commits to two periods of service) solves:
b(1 + ￿) ￿ p = ￿(b ￿ p2): (2)
Uniqueness comes from the fact that the optimal second period price (i.e. argmaxp[F(￿)￿
F(p)]p+￿s) is a non decreasing function of residual demand. It follows that at any
given ￿rst period price p strictly more consumers, if any, purchase in the two-period
game (buy i⁄ b ￿ p ￿ ￿p2) than in the one period game (buy i⁄ b ￿ p).24
Conversely, postponing shutdown entails a loss as the quantity s is cashed
later due to standard discounting (deferral e⁄ect). The seller hence trades-o⁄ the
incremental gains due to extended durability with the incremental losses due to the
deferral of the outside option. The higher the outside option, the lower the optimal
precommitment durability.
No commitment.￿ Now consider the more interesting case where the ￿rm
is unable to commit. Since in period 3 shutdown occurs with probability one then
those buyers still on the market in period 2 behave accordingly and buy i⁄b ￿ p. At
the beginning of period 2 the Seller has to evaluate what are the potential bene￿ts
of serving the residual demand compared with the sure option of s. Trivially, there
is a threshold levele b(s), de￿ned by:
e b(s) = max
￿
￿ ￿ b : max
p [F(￿) ￿ F(p)]p + ￿s ￿ s
￿
such that the seller always stays whenever ￿ > e b(s), always shutdowns whenever
￿ < e b(s) and is indi⁄erent whenever ￿ = e b(s), which is increasing in s up to b.
Consider now the ￿rst period. Since buyers care about "durability" their will-
ingness to pay depends on whether the next period the seller will stay or leave, that
is on whether residual demand will exceed e b(s) or not. The indi⁄erent buyer is now
de￿ned by:
b(1 + ￿ ) ￿ p = ￿ (b ￿ p2) (2￿ )
where   is the (equilibrium) probability that the seller doesn￿ t shutdown and makes
another o⁄er p2 in period two.
Intuitively if the ￿rst period price is su¢ ciently low then, even if buyers are
23Notice that, in standard models of intertemporal discrimination, the converse result holds since
there is no "durability e⁄ect".
24The assumption that maxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r > b guarantees that the seller never sells to everybody





















Figure 1: Indi⁄erent Buyer under Uniform Distribution
"pessimistic" (they expect only one period of service), enough of them purchase
and hence tomorrow the seller will actually shutdown with probability one. On the
contrary if the ￿rst period price is high enough, then even if buyers are "optimistic",
few of them purchase and tomorrow the seller will stay with probability one. Figure
1 captures this intuition and depicts the indi⁄erent buyer as a function of p, in the
simplest case of uniformly distributed buyers. Interestingly, for intermediate values
of p, a pure strategies equilibrium does not exist. To see this notice that if buyers are
optimistic, too many of them end up buying whereas if they are pessimistic, too few
of them purchase. In this intermediate price range for each ￿rst period price there
exists a unique continuation equilibrium in which: 1) only buyers with valuation
greater or equal than e b(s) purchase, 2) the seller randomizes between staying one
more period and shutting down and 3) the equilibrium probability of staying one
more period increases with the ￿rst period price. The upper bound of the interval,
denoted p(s), solves (2￿ ) when   = 1, b = e b(s) and p2 = argmaxp[F(e b(s))￿F(p)]p+
￿s.
Letting ￿(p) be the indi⁄erent buyer as a function of the ￿rst period price and
￿1(￿;s) ￿ maxfmaxp[F(￿) ￿ F(p)]p + ￿s;sg be the continuation value of the game
at the beginning of period 2, the seller program is given by:
max
p
[1 ￿ F(￿(p))]p + ￿￿1(￿(p);s): (3)
Let p￿ denote any solution of (3). By inspection it is possible to immediately exclude




since demand is insensitive to
price in this range. Such observation is a consequence of the seller￿ s inability to
charge low prices (p < p(s)) and all together maintain buyers￿con￿dence over dura-
















































Figure 2: (a) Value Function (b) Simulation
of equilibrium can arise: a "one-period equilibrium" in which the seller proposes a
low price p￿ < e b(s) and then shuts down; or a "two-period equilibrium" in which the
seller proposes a high price p￿ ￿ p(s) and then a lower price, conditional on selling.
By convexity, in this simple illustration it is possible to prove that for almost any
s ￿ 0 the equilibrium is unique. The "almost" quali￿er accounts for the possibility
that the Seller can be indi⁄erent, for some s, between a two-period and a one-period
equilibrium.
It is now possible to compare the two solutions. Figure 2a depicts the equi-
librium pro￿ts as a function of the shutdown reward both in the commitment and
in the no commitment case. Consider the latter. An higher s a⁄ects the game in
two respects. As in the commitment case, it raises the continuation value of the
game, since s is cashed at some point (direct e⁄ect). Furthermore it increases the
temptation to shutdown, since it raises the threshold e b(s) and, as a consequence, the
minimum price p(s) that guarantees that tomorrow shutdown will not occur with
probability one (indirect e⁄ect). Let pc
1 denote the optimal ￿rst period price when
the seller commits to two periods of sales. For relatively low values of s the seller
charges pc
1, thus replicating the commitment solution as dynamic inconsistency is
not a concern. However if, for some values of s, p(s) exceeds pc
1 whereas the opti-
mal precommitment durability is 2, then it is possible to prove that the seller ￿nds
worthwhile, in some range (sa;sb), to distort his ￿rst period price upwards (up to
p(s)) to preserve his own incentives to stay on the market and therefore to maintain
buyer￿ s con￿dence over durability. If the indirect e⁄ect (negative) of a marginal
increase of s overwhelms the direct e⁄ect (￿2) then the value function could well
decrease in this range. Eventually (s 2 (sb;sc)) the seller switches to a low price
12(< e b(s)) and therefore shuts down at the beginning of period 2, even tough he would
prefer to commit to two periods of sales.
The following proposition (proved in the appendix) contains this section main
insights. It establishes that, for any parametrization of the model, there always
exists a ￿ low enough (possibly greater than one) such that this is actually the case
in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In the two period game, if players are su¢ ciently impatient then
there exists an open, convex and non empty subset of shutdown values s such that:
(i) The precommitment pro￿ts exceed the equilibrium pro￿ts.
(ii) The seller charges higher prices than in the precommitment case in both peri-
ods.25
(iii) Equilibrium pro￿ts decrease with the shutdown reward.
Figure 2b plots the value function for di⁄erent values of the discount factor
when b is uniformly distributed in [1;3]. Values on both axes are expressed in % of
the rental solution ￿fc(2=3). Notice that for ￿ = 2=3 the value function increases
with the shutdown reward whereas for ￿ = 1=2 and ￿ = 1=3 this is no longer the
case. In particular for delta equal to 1=3 the value of the outside option becomes
actually negative for some s > 0 and therefore the seller would get more if s were
equal to zero.
B. Discussion
So far I only addressed the issue of existence and uniqueness. Before moving on,
it is worth taking a few lines to comment on and summarize a number of features of
the equilibrium. First, the unique restriction invoked so far is the so called "gap case"
that is b > 0. It is possible to show that nothing changes if we let b = 0 whenever
s > 0. However, when both parameters are equal to zero, it is not possible to bound
the number of sales periods and therefore to have a complete characterization of the
equilibrium set. In this case durability is always in￿nite26 but the actual allocation
of gains from trade varies over the equilibrium set.
The shutdown reward can be interpreted either as the opportunity cost of stay-
ing on a given market or as an alternative elastic demand. Therefore one can ￿nd
examples where this theory directly applies. For instance in the video games and
software industries ￿rms typically have to maintain essential complementary ser-
vices such as on-line platforms or after sales support that typically don￿ t generate
25Clearly (ii) )(i), however there are values of s such that only (i) holds, this is why the two
statements are apart.
26The seller will never charge a price equal to zero.
13enough revenues to cover their costs. However the buyers￿willingness to pay for the
main product crucially depends on the availability of such services. Sound economic
reasoning would suggest these ￿rms to build a reputation for keeping their servers
up. According to the shutdown model, if the price at which their titles sell on the
market do not justify further investments even if the publishers were able to build
such a reputation, for instance because the opportunity cost is particularly high,
then their shutdown policy could be interpreted as a means to maximize pro￿ts
rather than as an expression of a dynamic inconsistency issue.
III. Innovation Cycles
This section completes the theoretical investigation. It presents an equilibrium
analysis of a market in which a seller can, at a cost c, destroy the value of all units
previously sold and simultaneously introduce a new version. The model focuses on
the pure "destructive" aspect of innovation by assuming that the new versions are
of no additional value (the e⁄ect of relaxing this assumption are discussed in section
5). The cost c can be interpreted as any expenditure incurred in the process of
destruction.27 It can also be interpreted as the cost of creating, developing and
marketing the new versions. Clearly if such cost is su¢ ciently low then innovation
cycles of ￿nite length endogenously arise.
The extensive form described in section 2 is modi￿ed replacing the shutdown
option with an innovate option in the way described below. Innovating destroys
the value of the old products, if any (and in this respect is equivalent to shutdown).
However a ￿xed cost c ￿ 0 must be paid each time an innovation takes place.
The utility from purchasing the latest version evaluated at t ￿ T is still given by
(1) where T is now interpreted as the last period of sales before a new version is
introduced. The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of period 1 the
monopolist faces an entry decision.28 He can either stay out of the market or pay c,
create a product and ￿x a price p1 that all buyers evaluate. When the former option
is chosen the game ends and the monopolist obtains 0. Conditional on entry, at the
beginning of each subsequent period t = 2;:::;1 the monopolist can either continue
to serve residual demand and hence propose a price pt or innovate. When the latter
option is selected the monopolist pays c and starts to sell his new product, which is
in all respects identical to the old one, by ￿xing a new price and so on. De￿ne the
period between two successive innovations as a "cycle".
27E.g., the costs of restrictive after market practices, the cost of setting a new standard or of
shutting down existing platforms.
28Alternatively one could assume that the seller is "endowed" with his ￿rst product and pays c
only to innovate (there is no entry decision). To simplify thinghs I also assume w.l.o.g. that the
seller always enters whenever indi⁄erent.
14As the outcome of each cycle is uniquely determined by the continuation pay-
o⁄s after an innovation takes place (proposition 2), the problem has the ￿ avour of a
repeated game. That is: after each innovation the seller and the buyers play a game
which is equivalent in all respects to the previous one save for the expected contin-
uation payo⁄ following an innovation which varies with the pro￿le under scrutiny.
Let ￿ = 1;2;::; index the innovations and let se
￿ be the expected value of the game
after the ￿-th innovation net of the (future) innovation costs. An equilibrium of the





￿ + c 2 ￿(￿;se
￿+1)
(b) se
￿ 2 [0;￿fc ￿ c]
since to any such sequence it is possible to associate the corresponding "stage
game" equilibrium pro￿les. The ￿rst condition simply re￿ ects the requirement of
subgame perfection. The latter condition remarks the upper and lower bounds of
the seller￿ s pro￿ts. If an equilibrium sequence is constant over ￿ then the associated
equilibrium is said to be stationary. Stationary equilibria are obviously more attrac-
tive as the value of an innovation does not depend directly on time t. For this reason
in most of what follows I focus attention on this class of equilibria. However it turns
out that (some) non stationary equilibria unveil aspects of the seller￿ s problem that
could be equally interpreted in economic terms and hence are worth exploring. In-
deed there are cases where non stationary equilibria dominate the stationary ones.
Their discussion is postponed to section 4.
A. Stationary Equilibrium
I now proceed to characterize the stationary equilibrium of the game. An
important issue is that the link between the seller￿ s eagerness to innovate and his
continuation payo⁄ can generate multiplicity. For instance, suppose that the Seller
is optimistic in that he expects the upcoming cycles to be short. If shorter cycles
are more pro￿table, the Seller will be eager to innovate and hence the current cycle
is expected to end soon in equilibrium. On the other hand the same reasoning
applies for pessimistic sellers: beliefs over the future might self-ful￿ll. The proof of
the following theorem breaks down this argument arguing that this full-￿lling e⁄ect
would require the expected continuation value of the game to decrease (or increase)
"without bounds".
Theorem 1 A stationary equilibrium exists and is unique in the class of stationary
equilibria. Moreover if the cost of innovation is low enough (c < ￿(￿;0)) entry























Figure 3: (a) c = 0 (b) c > 0
occurs and the equilibrium is characterized by an in￿nite replication of symmetric
cycles.
The proof looks for any ￿xed point s￿ of the correspondence ￿(￿;s) ￿ c that
satis￿es (b). To see that no more than one ￿xed point can exist it is su¢ cient to
consider what happens when any se
￿ is arbitrarily set below (above) a ￿xed point.
For instance if the buyers and the seller are pessimistic over the future, i.e. se
￿ < s￿,
then such future would self-ful￿ll if and only if such pessimism grows over time
without bounds. The point can be intuitively explained using ￿gure 3a. Assume
(for simplicity) that ￿ has modulus of continuity lower than one in absolute terms.
Recall from section 2 that for every se < ￿fc the seller stays at least one period
on the market as it gets more than just grabbing s. Therefore if se
￿ < ￿fc then
it should be that se
￿ > se
￿+1 for se
￿ to be ful￿lled in equilibrium. Iterating this
reasoning, eventually se
￿+i will jump outside the payo⁄ bounds in (b) and hence it
is not possible to construct an equilibrium around any such trajectory.
Let
￿(￿;c) = ￿(￿;￿(￿;c)) ￿ c (4)
be the value of the game. The theorem says that there exists only one perfect equi-
librium that satis￿es the stationarity assumption. If the average30 cost of innovation
is low enough, the model reproduces a crucial feature of these durable markets: the
cyclical introduction of non-overlapping generations of goods or, alternatively, the
cyclical destruction and contextual introduction of a new generation of products.
30Since pro￿ts are measured per-capita, c can be interpreted as the $cost of destruction per
buyer.
16B. Properties of Innovation Cycles
I shall now ask what are the properties of these innovation cycles, what is the
(relative) pro￿tability of destructive creation so as compared with the full and partial
commitment solutions and how does this pro￿tability vary with the innovation cost
c. Finally I shall ask what is the role of pricing and hence what kind of predictions
it is possible to make on the within cycles equilibrium prices. Much of what follows
capitalizes the investment made in section 2.
Proposition 4 If innovation is costless then equilibrium pro￿ts equal the rental
solution pro￿ts. Furthermore the equilibrium is unique31 and characterized by a new
innovation in every period.
That when c = 0 the equilibrium pro￿ts equal the rental (or full commitment)
solution comes at no surprise. Selling a good that is expected (and is actually)
costlessly destroyed after each period is trivially equivalent to renting in a world
with no marginal costs of production. For low enough values of c the "always
innovating" solution continues both to exist and to be unique with the monopolist
now paying a (little) fee every period: ￿(￿;c) = ￿fc ￿ c=(1 ￿ ￿).
Proposition 5 Consider the stationary equilibrium and suppose that the cost of
innovation is such that entry occurs.
(i) Equilibrium pro￿ts decrease with the cost of innovation.
(ii) The equilibrium length of each cycle (weakly) increases with the cost of innova-
tion.
(iii) The (within) cycle price path exhibits Coasian dynamics.
Moreover consider the two period illustration of section 2. If the cost of innovation
is such that an intertemporal con￿ict arises then:
(iv) Innovation occurs weakly too soon, from an ex-ante, pro￿t maximizing perspec-
tive.
(v) A high enough ￿rst period price is followed by delayed innovation and this can
be used to maintain buyers￿con￿dence over "durability" in those instances where an
intertemporal con￿ict arises.
Rather than cluttering the remaining part of the paper with formal statements
about the relationship between the cost c and the equilibrium length of each cycle
(or equilibrium durability) I limit myself to observe that there is a one to one
relationship between the outside option￿ s thresholds de￿ned in section 2 and the
cost thresholds in the innovation game. By (i) higher costs lower the value of an
innovation. Hence, in terms of the shutdown game, higher costs lower the outside


















































































































Figure 4: Simulation of the value function: (a) ￿(c)=￿fc (b) ￿(c)=￿c(c)
option and therefore increase the equilibrium durability of each and every product.
More interesting is the comparison between the equilibrium pro￿ts and the
pro￿ts the seller would make under commitment to introduction policies. Figure 6a
plots the both value functions when b is uniformly distributed in [1;3] and ￿ = 1=2.
The value is expressed in % of the rental solution. Figure 6b plots the value of the
game as a % of the value under a commitment to an optimal introduction policy. The
discussion parallels section 2￿ s analysis as these are clearly two facets of exactly the
same problem. For low enough values of c the commitment solution coincides with
the no commitment one, since the seller￿ s dynamic inconsistency is not a concern.
For intermediate values of c an intertemporal con￿ ict arises. Under commitment the
seller switches sooner to two-period cycles since it doesn￿ t have to pay the extra-cost
of persuading the buyers that he will indeed wait one more period before introducing
his new product. Hence in equilibrium, for relatively low values of c, the seller
continues to innovate every period even tough he would prefer to commit not to.
The higher c, the lower the attractiveness of a one-period equilibrium as compared
to a two-period one. Eventually the seller will ￿nd pro￿table to implement the "high
pricing scheme" to save on innovation costs. In this range he charges higher prices
than the precommitment ones in both periods to maintain the buyers con￿dence
over durability. Lastly for c high enough the equilibrium matches once again the
commitment solution up to the point where the innovation costs are so high that
the seller prefers to stay out of the market altogether.
In the stationary equilibrium, Waldman￿ s intuition about the seller￿ s tendency
to innovate "too much" from an ex-ante, pro￿t maximizing perspective still applies
31Actually I prove that the stationary equilibria is the unique equilibrium of the game for c equal
or "close enough" to zero.
18(Although with some caveats as for some values of c there is no con￿ ict32), but his
conjecture that
"...the ￿rm might be able to mitigate the e⁄ects of this time inconsistency
problem by choosing a technology that is excessively costly to improve."
(Waldman 1996 pp. 593)
does not hold when one allows for heterogeneous consumers. In this model, were
the seller able to choose from more than one production technology at the beginning
of the game, he will always choose the most e¢ cient one despite his (eventual) time
inconsistency problem. This can help explain why ￿rms such as "Microsoft, do not
seem to be taking any such actions" (Waldman 2003, pp.147) that constrain their
own ability to introduce upgrades.
Why Waldman￿ s conjecture does not apply? As I have shown that the value of
the shutdown game can indeed decrease with the continuation value of the game due
to the seller￿ s dynamic inconsistency, it is legitimate to question whether increas-
ing the innovation cost can actually raise the seller pro￿tability in this extended
framework as it mitigates the time inconsistency problem, if any.
The intuition goes as follows. The marginal impact of innovation costs can be
decomposed in two e⁄ects. First, higher costs decrease the continuation value of
the game since they are actually incurred in equilibrium (negative e⁄ect). Second,
in those instances where an intertemporal con￿ ict arises, they reduce the relative
cost of implementing the high pricing regime because they reduce the temptation to
innovate (positive e⁄ect). In other words, lower expected earnings from innovation
relax the "credibility constraint" and permit to safely expand supply in earlier pe-
riods. The combined e⁄ect is always negative as the higher expenses incurred due
to raising costs outweigh the marginal bene￿ts which are bounded above by one.
So a ￿rm would never gain by constraining his own ability to practice destructive
creation through increasing its costs.
Finally, the model reproduces the cyclic price patterns that characterize most
durable goods markets. Within each cycle, prices decrease due to standard Coasian
dynamics. However when a new model is created, the introduction (or ￿rst period)
price jumps up to the price at which the previous version was introduced. In this
particular framework introductory prices do not re￿ ect the incremental value of the
new products (as one would expect if the new products were of higher quality).
They are instead correlated with the introductory prices of previous product lines,
something that could be amenable to empirical investigation.
32The fact that the seller ex-ante and ex-post incentives to innovate are aligned for some c is






















Figure 5: Non-stationary equilibria: (a) Cycling cycles (b) Innovation trap
IV. Robustness and extensions: Innovation Traps and Cycling Cycles.
This section discusses a number of features of the equilibrium that have been
previously assumed away. First, it considers the e⁄ect of relaxing the assumption
that there is an epsilon sunk cost that should be paid to provide an extra period
of durability. Then it characterizes the non stationary equilibria of the (extended)
model. Finally it provides a su¢ cient condition for the stationary equilibrium to be
unique.
Consider the stationary equilibrium. The assumption that staying idle on the
market is costly has bite only when the (expected) value of an innovation is equal
to zero (or when s = 0 in section 2 notation). Therefore it has bite only when the
innovation costs are high enough to drain all the revenues from future sales. Let
￿1 denote the revenues that the seller makes if he commits to never innovate.33
If we replace the assumption above with a milder one, namely that lower (last
period) prices are never "cue" of higher durability34 (AA), then Lemma 1 and hence
proposition 2 continue to hold. For every c a stationary equilibrium exists and is still
unique but characterized by entry for cost levels up to ￿1(> ￿(￿;0)). The higher
the cost, the lower the frequency of innovation that keeps the continuation pro￿ts
equal to zero. When c 2 [￿(￿;0);￿1) the seller is caught in an "innovation trap".
He is unable to make any pro￿ts even if he could make some by simply abstaining
from innovating which is a weakly dominated strategy. In this cost region the mere
33Notice that ￿1 is nothing else then the value of the (unique) equilibrium of a standard durable
good model in which the utility that a type b gets upon purchase is constant over time and given
by b=(1 ￿ ￿) and there are no ￿xed costs.
34Formally, it is su¢ cient to require the "expected" residual durability at the time everybody
purchases one unit (i.e. in the last period of sales) to be non decreasing in the last period of sales￿
price.
20fact that the seller is expected to behave opportunistically prevents him from asking
higher prices on the market.35
Other (non-stationary) equilibria may arise for two mutually exclusive reasons
depending on the cost level c. First, since the slope of the value function can exceed
1 in absolute terms then other sequences fse
￿g￿ that satisfy conditions (a) and (b)
may exist in addition to the ￿xed point. For instance there could exist converging
patterns, i.e. sequences of expectations that converge asymptotically to the ￿xed
point36 as well as cycling patterns as the one depicted in ￿gure 5a. Second, if the
cost of innovation is in [￿(￿;0);￿1(￿;0)] then any sequence of the form (s1;0;0;::)
with s1 2 [0;￿1 ￿ c] can be supported as an equilibrium outcome (￿gure 5b). The
expectation of making no pro￿ts out of innovating may still justify to make some
positive pro￿ts in the ￿rst cycle. For instance if c 2 [￿(￿;0);￿1) there always exists
an equilibrium in which the seller never innovates (as the value of an innovation is
zero) whose associated pro￿ts are given by ￿1 ￿ c > 0 where c is the entry cost.
Notice that these latter outcomes dominate the stationary equilibrium in which
the seller is caught in an innovation trap. Although stationary equilibria are typi-
cally more attractive, innovation traps generated by "pessimistic" expectations over
durability are somewhat less likely to arise since in the repeated game the seller can
frustrate these expectations and provide higher durability at no cost. The following
corollary of theorem 1 gives a su¢ cient condition for the stationary equilibrium to
be unique.
Corollary 1 If c 2 [0;￿(￿;0)) and j@￿(￿;s)=@sj < 1 8s then the equilibrium of the
innovation game is unique.
The ￿rst condition eliminates equilibria of the latter type as it insures that the
continuation value of the game is always positive. The second condition guarantees
that ￿￿1 is a contraction mapping and therefore that any sequence starting at any
value other than the ￿xed point will diverge.
V. Discussion
An interesting question is what would happen if the government could a⁄ect
the incentives to practice destructive creation, for instance, mandating the provision
of security support for a minimum number of years. For this purpose consider the
problem of a regulator who can a⁄ect the cost c. De￿ne welfare as the discounted
35In a previous version of this paper (available on request) I show that the above analysis remains
valid even absent any restriction for the case s = 0, at the cost of higher complexity.
36If @￿(￿;s)=@s < ￿1 for some s then one can ￿nd a cost range in which ￿(￿;s)￿c is a contraction
mapping for s close enough to the ￿xed point.
































































































Figure 6: Total Surplus and its decomposition (a) ￿ = 1=5 (b) ￿ = 2=3
total surplus, that is, the sum of the consumers￿surplus and the seller￿ s pro￿ts gross
of innovation costs.
Since we already know that equilibrium pro￿ts are non increasing in c, consider
consumer surplus. A higher c a⁄ects consumers￿ surplus in two, di⁄erent ways
depending on whether it increases or not the equilibrium durability. Suppose that
this is not the case, i.e. suppose that a marginal increase of the cost does not trigger
any reduction in durability. If the seller is operating in the high pricing region then
such increase relax the "credibility" constraint and therefore result in lower prices
and in higher consumers￿surplus. In all other cases higher costs simply lower pro￿ts
as the seller keeps on charging the precommitment prices.
Conversely a marginal increase in c may trigger higher durability. In this case
the impact on consumers￿surplus is typically ambiguous. Increasing the length
of each cycle clearly increases the number of equilibrium o⁄ers and therefore the
number of consumers who have access to the good, but at the same time alters
the relative price and period at which di⁄erent consumers join the owners￿group.
Therefore consumers￿surplus can again increase with the equilibrium length of each
cycle depending on the parametrization of the model. If the resulting increase in
consumers￿surplus outweighs the seller￿ s losses then total welfare may well increase
with the innovations costs.
Figure 6 depicts total surplus as a function of c for the two-period game intro-
duced earlier.37 Consider consumers￿surplus. The vertical drop, mirrored in total
37The welfare function is simulated using the same parametrization for the two-period game
employed throughout the article. Values are in % of the total welfare under full commitment
22welfare, corresponds to the case in which a marginal increase in c triggers higher
durability. In this speci￿c case, for both discount factors, consumers are on average
worse o⁄when the equilibrium length of each cycle increases from one period to two
periods. The subsequent increasing portion of the curve corresponds to the case in
which higher costs relax the dynamic inconsistency constraint. Interestingly, ￿gure
6(a) (as opposed to ￿gure 6(b)) illustrates a case in which the resulting increase in
consumers￿surplus outweighs the seller￿ s losses with the result that total welfare
increases with c despite the social waste due to higher costs. Worth noticing is also
the shaded region on the right side of both plots. It re￿ ects the seller￿ s indi⁄erence
between entering or not when c 2 [￿(￿;0);￿1]. Conditional on entry, the seller is
caught in the "innovation trap" described above in which expected pro￿ts are equal
to zero. Since consumers always bene￿t from having access to the monopolist￿ s
product, in this region welfare depends trivially on the equilibrium probability of
entry.
These considerations suggest that the regulator￿ s task of ￿ne tuning the cost c is
particularly arduous in this framework. Irrespective of how much consumers￿surplus
is weighed relative to the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts, increasing the cost of destruction can
back￿re, leading to lower surplus for all parties involved.
A. Non destructive creation
Clearly allowing for "non empty" (or improved) innovations won￿ t change much
as long as the seller can likewise destroy the value of old units. Improved versions
increase the temptation to practice destructive creation as consumers value more
the new generations of goods. However the qualitative results remain unchanged.38
Yet with one important conceptual di⁄erence. In this paper destroying old products
restores market power preventing Coasian dynamics which usually ends up hurting
consumers￿welfare. When innovations are not empty, destructive creation serves
a second, more noble, purpose. As Fishman and Rob (2000) point out, when a
durable good monopolist introduces a new, improved version39 he can only charge
for the incremental value the new product provides until its replacement by a yet-
better model, as otherwise consumers would wait the next generation of goods. On
the other hand such incremental value is enjoyed forever which implies that the
incentives to invest are below the social optimum level. Destructive creation helps
the seller to recover the full value of the innovation and thus preserves the incentives
to innovate. This argument adds a further cautionary note for the regulator who
wants to forbid this practice.
calculated in c = 0.
38A suitable renormalization of the model would preserve all the qualitative results.
39In their model the new version incorporates all the previous improvements.
23Consider now the more general case of genuine, non destructive innovation (i.e.
"Creative Destruction"). An important question is whether the mere introduction of
superior products can be itself a means of destroying the value of previous versions.
If rational buyers are willing to pay less for the current product whenever they
expect future innovations then it is "as if" the sellers are actually destroying (at
least part of) the value of their previous versions with their new introductions. In
such cases one would expect, among other things, analogous e⁄ects to arise.
One reason why this could happen is due to a "replacement e⁄ect" on the
willingness to pay. More precisely, consider a simple extension of the two-period
illustration of section 2 with the twist that the seller can introduce a superior product
rather than shutting down and that old products continue to be fully functional.
The shutdown reward can be interpreted as the expected discounted value of the
innovation. In a two-period world with no overlapping innovations, no second hand
markets and anonymous buyers, the mere expectation of replacing the old good (i.e.
substituting your old laptop with a new one) lowers the willingness to pay of repeated
purchasers to the equivalent value of one period of service. The (classic) case of
the Osborne Computer Corporation illustrates one instance of this phenomenon.
At the beginning of the 80￿ s the company, (that invented the ￿rst mass-produced
portable computer) went unexpectedly bankrupt as the announcement of a new line
of revolutionary products killed the demand for the company￿ s existing products,
causing ￿nancial distress.
Previous related works in this literature include Fudenberg and Tirole (1998)
and Lee and Lee (1998) who present a two-period model of technological innovation
with heterogeneous buyers in which a seller introduces an improved product in period
2. However in both articles technological progress is exogenously given40 and hence
there is no role for destructive creation. Nahm (2004) endogenizes the R&D decision
to capture the interactions between the outstanding stock of the old product and
the incentives to introduce a new one. In his paper (net sales case) the existence of
perfect second hand markets compensates repeated purchasers and thus o⁄sets the
"replacement e⁄ect" described above (there is no destruction). In analogy, one can
conjecture than any mechanism that permits to compensate repeated purchasers
(i.e. o⁄er discounts) will have the e⁄ect of mitigating (or even assume away) the
"destructive" downside of the innovative activity.
VI. Concluding remarks
Destructive creation o⁄ers a stylized description of many markets and indus-
tries. In particular it o⁄ers an interpretive key for recent business cases of destruction
40In Lee and Lee (1998) innovation is actually a choice variable but the seller commits to R&D
before the ￿rst period of sales.
24as well as for other classic court cases concerning the issue of aftermarket monopo-
lization. In principle banning altogether the use of this mechanism would have the
desirable e⁄ects of restoring Coasian dynamics and of preventing the social waste
that comes with empty innovations. This could be done, for instance, by requiring
after-sale services, extending warranties, mandating compatibility or preventing and
monitoring the institution of new industrial standards of little (or no) incremental
value which trigger waves of mass replacements. However, such plan of action would
require value judgments on the nature of innovations and assessments of the ￿rms￿
cost schedules in the after-markets. Furthermore, it seems more reasonable to think
that a regulator can, at best, increase the cost of practicing destructive creation. As
we have seen, an intervention in this direction can potentially reduce both the total
and the consumers￿surplus even if new vintages are indeed of no additional value.
One compelling research avenue is to identify under what conditions the mere
introduction of superior products can generate a similar dynamics in the more com-
plex setting with recurrent, non destructive innovations. On the empirical side event
studies could be performed to assess what is the impact (if any) of the introduction
(or of the expected introduction) of a new generation of products on the value of the
old ones through measurements, for instance, of prices￿variations in the primary
and secondary markets. These and other related issues remain the topic of future
research.
25VII. Appendix
The proof of lemma 1 and Proposition 2 are adapted from Fudenberg, Levine and
Tirole (1985). Subscripts attached to mappings denote the number of sales￿periods
left before shutdown in equilibrium unless otherwise indicated.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
If the seller can commit to shutdown time (or can guarantee any durability he wants)
then the utility that type b gets from purchasing in the ￿rst period a good that lasts
up to T is given by b
PT
i=1 ￿i￿1 In a related context Stokey (1979) and Riley and
Zeckhauser (1983) proved that the optimal precommitment strategy is to "hold ￿rm"
and charge a ￿xed price throughout the horizon. Type b buys in the ￿rst period i⁄
b ￿ p=
PT









p + ￿Ts equivalent to:
max




since p = b
PT
i=1 ￿i￿1. From (5) it is clear that the optimal price does not depend
on T and that it should be equal to
PT
i=1 ￿i￿1 times the rental price. Consider the
associated envelope ￿fc(T) = [1 ￿ F (r￿)]r￿ PT
i=1 ￿i￿1+￿Ts where r￿ is any solution
of (5). ￿fc(T + 1) ￿ ￿fc(T) = ￿T([1 ￿ F (r￿)]r￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)s). The latter expression
is greater than zero whenever s <
[1￿F(r￿)]r￿
1￿￿ which establishes the result.
B. Proof of lemma 1
The proof is divided in three parts.
1) [sorting condition] Notice that in any equilibrium the residual set of buyers fol-
lowing an o⁄er pt is the prior set [b;bt] truncated from above at some point bt+1 ￿ bt
(i.e. a sorting condition holds) where bt is de￿ned as the owner with the lowest
valuation at time t. To see this let ￿m : H ￿! ￿[R+ ￿ f0;1g] denote a (behavior)
strategy for the seller and ￿b : H ￿! f0;1g denote a (pure) strategy for type b
where H represents the set of all possible histories in every period in which shut
down has not occurred and ￿(￿) is the set of all probability distributions over prices
and shutdown decisions. Given any seller￿ s pro￿le type b buys at time t i⁄
T X
i=t
￿i￿tb ￿ pt ￿ ￿Vb(b;Ht;T) (6)
Where Vb(b;Ht;T) is his valuation at time t+1 given history Ht when the monopolist











if T ￿ t + 1 or 0 otherwise. The term in brackets is the discounted utility ￿ ow con-
ditional on purchase at time j; ￿j(b;Ht) is the equilibrium probability, conditional
on today￿ s information Ht that purchase is made at time j. Let b0 > b. Since type b
can always mimic b0￿ s optimal strategy, that is, accept exactly when b0 accepts, then












which in turn implies an upper bound on the di⁄erence:











Intuitively, the di⁄erence between the two continuation values cannot be greater
because otherwise type b would obtain more by mimicking type b0. This observation
coupled with the fact that ￿ < 1 and that
P








￿i￿j(b0 ￿ b) (7)
Subtracting side to side (6) into (7) we obtain:
T X
i=t
￿i￿tb0 ￿ pt > ￿Vb(b0;Ht;T) (8)
that is if type b ￿nds optimal to buy today at price pt (i.e. (6) holds) then any other
buyer b0 > b accepts the same price with probability 1.
2) [lowerbound on prices] Notice that the seller never (i.e. in no subgame) charges
a price below b41 whenever s > 0. To see this let p denote the in￿mum of the prices
o⁄ered by the monopolist in any subgame. At this price everybody buys as a better
deal in the future cannot be expected. Observe that 1) p should necessarily be
lower or equal than b as otherwise type b would never accept it, as shutdown always
occurs in any subgame in which he has already purchased; 2) p should necessarily
be greater than ￿1 since gains from trade are ￿nite. To see that p < b cannot be
an equilibrium o⁄er assume that tomorrow￿ s price is expected to be p (i.e. minimize
41this trivially extends to the case s = 0 under our additional assumption that there is an epsilon
sunk cost to stay one more period on the market.
27all buyers willingness to pay) and consider type b￿ s problem. Type b prefers to buy
today i⁄ b ￿ p ￿ ￿(b ￿ p) i.e. i⁄ p ￿ p + (1 ￿ ￿)(b ￿ p). This implies that as long
as p < b there always exists a price p > p such that type b and thus any other
type buys. Therefore the Seller can raise p by a discrete amount and still have full
demand in every such subgame, a contradiction.
3) [￿nite nature] Given the sorting condition and the lowerbound on prices I want to
show that there always exists a given posterior b￿ beyond which charging b > 0 and
selling to everybody is a dominant strategy. Assume that buyers b > be have already
bought the good and that all the remaining buyers play myopically and accept all
prices less than their valuation. Moreover assume that everybody expects an in￿nite
durability. If a monopolist wishes to charge b against this optimistic and myopic
buyers he will do so against any other buyer, since any other (rational) buyer would
be less likely to purchase. Myopic and optimistic buyers buy i⁄ p ￿ b
1￿￿ , b ￿
p(1 ￿ ￿). Pro￿ts are given by









b bf(b)db is clearly an upperbound of the continuation value (it has
been obtained assuming that tomorrow the monopolist would be able to perfectly
discriminate against all remaining myopic and optimistic buyers). Di⁄erentiating
with respect to p yields:
@￿
@p
= [F(be) ￿ F(p(1 ￿ ￿))] ￿ f(p(1 ￿ ￿))[1 ￿ ￿]
2 (9)
since f > 0 there always exists a threshold b￿ > b such that 8be < b￿ @￿
@p < 0 for any p
and thus p￿ = b and game ends since (9) is increasing in be. Lastly I show that there
always exists a T < 1 such that residual demand drops below b￿ within T periods
when s = 0. Suppose not. Notice that, by charging p = b the Seller can guarantee
himself at least [F(b￿) ￿ F(b)]b ￿ k > 0 that implies that the continuation value of
the game Vs(be) should always be at least k as otherwise deviating to p = b would








once again assuming that buyers are both myopic and optimistic. Since the latter
expression strictly decreases with be, there exists another threshold b￿￿ such that
B(b) < k i⁄ be < b￿￿. Therefore the posterior should never drop below b￿￿ as
otherwise Vs drops below k. Similarly one can construct a sequence fbngn of such
28thresholds with the property that:




which in turn implies that eventually bn > be, i.e. that the posterior cannot drop
below be as otherwise the seller would ￿nd pro￿table to deviate to p = b and game
ends.
C. Proof of proposition 2
Wlog prices are always restricted in some compact set [b;p] as nobody would accept a
price p > b=(1￿￿). A pure strategy for the seller is a mapping ￿ : H ! [b;p]￿f0;1g;
a continuation strategy, given history ht is a mapping ￿ : Ht ! [b;p] ￿ f0;1g where
Ht ￿ H is the set of all possible continuation histories given ht. As the Seller
may well randomize, any continuation strategy speci￿es a probability distribution
over prices and shutdown probabilities for every subgame. Since all players care only
about expected prices and shutdown probabilities, any two (behavior) strategies that
generate the same expectations for the same history are considered as equivalent. To
perform some comparative statics it is necessary to specify one ordering of sets which
will be useful later on. Consider a generic compact and real valued correspondence
￿ : X ￿ R ! Y . According to Veinott (1989) ordering of sets, I will say that,
given any two x;x0 such that x0 ￿ x with x0 6= x, for any a0 2 ￿(x0); a 2 ￿(x), ￿
is non decreasing whenever maxfa0;ag 2 ￿(x0) and minfa0;ag 2 ￿(x); is strictly
increasing whenever a0 ￿ a and is strongly increasing whenever a0 > a.






(F(be) ￿ F(￿(p))p + ￿￿(￿(p);s)
￿
  + (1 ￿  )s
where ￿ and ￿ are well de￿ned continuous functions. Let ￿(be;s;p) denote the
associated solution correspondence with respect to p, b ￿(be;s;p) its convex hull and
 (be;s;p) the associated solution correspondence with respect to  . The argument
p will be omitted whenever p = b=(1 ￿ ￿) (unrestricted program). Notice that both
￿ and   and therefore b ￿ correspondences are non empty, compact valued and upper
hemi-continuous by Berge￿ s theorem. Since the objective function is continuous
and (F(be) ￿ F(￿(p))p is strictly supermodular in be (f(be) > 0) then ￿(be;s) and
therefore b ￿(be;s) are strictly increasing in be (Topkis 1978). Lastly notice that the
associated value function increases with be and s whenever ￿(￿(p);s) increases with
s. Notice that this modi￿ed42 speci￿cation of the objective function permits to
separate the pricing strategy from the shutdown policy. It is then possible to de￿ne
42I￿ m taking the max (1 ￿  )(maxp(￿)) rather than max  maxp(￿).
29a strategy as any pair of functions ￿ ￿ (￿(H); (H)) that specify an (expected)
price and a probability of shutdown for every subgame.
Let ￿0(￿(p);s) = s. De￿ne recursively the n-period game and its associated prob-
lem P(be;￿n;￿n￿1;s;p) as the game where the seller is constrained to shutdown
after at most n periods of sales where ￿n maps prices into indi⁄erent buyers and
￿n￿1(￿n(p);s) is the value of the n ￿ 1-period game. If ￿n and ￿n￿1 are well de-
￿ned functions then the problem is well de￿ned. Denote with ￿n, b ￿n and  n the
associated solution correspondences. Lastly let ￿￿
n(H) ￿ (￿n(H); n(H)) denote an
equilibrium pro￿le for the n-period game.
Consider the one-period game. Obviously ￿1(p) = p as long as p ￿ be and hence its
associated problem is well de￿ned. Let e b1(s) = fmaxbe 2 R+ : ￿1(be;s) = sg be the
threshold on residual demand that leaves the seller indi⁄erent between shutdown
and one period of sales. Clearly shutdown is a strictly dominant strategy whenever
be < e b1(s); a weakly dominant strategy whenever be = e b1(s) and a dominated
strategy whenever be > e b1(s). Let e p1(s) ￿ e b1(s).
Lemma 2 For any history such that bt < e b1(s), ￿￿(Ht) = ￿￿
1(Ht) = (￿1(bt);0).
The claim is that shutdown is actually a dominant strategy for any history such
that bt < e b1(s). To see this recall from lemma 1 that b￿ is the posterior such that it
is always optimal to charge pt = b whenever bt 2 [b;b￿]. If b￿ ￿ e b1(s) (case "s low")
then, conditional on staying, the seller charges pt = b which results in F(bt)b pro￿ts
less than s by de￿nition of e b1(s). Consider now the complementary case: s such that
b￿ < e b1(s). If bt 2 [b;b￿] then, by the same logic, shutdown is a dominant strategy.





. The claim is that if bt 2 [b;b￿ + "] then shutdown is a dominant
strategy. To see this notice that if the seller does not shutdown at time t then either
bt+1 ￿ b￿ or bt+1 2 [b￿;b￿ + "]. In the former case shutdown takes place at time
t + 1 with probability one and therefore ￿ = ￿1, ￿ = s and the seller gets at most
￿1(be;s) which is less than s by de￿nition of e b1(s). In the latter case an upperbound
on what the seller can get is given by [F(b￿ + ") ￿ F(b￿)](b￿+")=(1￿￿)+￿s which is
less than s by de￿nition of ". Therefore, for any history ht such that bt 2 [b;b￿ + "]






Lemma 3 If pt < e p1(s) then bt+1 < e b1(s):
The claim is that when a price pt < e p1(s) is charged then shutdown occurs tomorrow
with probability one. Suppose not. Then it should be that bt+1 ￿ e b1(s) and that
 t+1 > 0 as otherwise type ￿1(pt) < e b1(s) should have accepted pt. Type e b1(s)
30prefers to buy today rather than tomorrow i⁄ e b1(s) ￿ pt ￿ ￿pt+1 t+1. The latter
is always lower or equal than pt ￿ ￿b since by lemma 1 the seller never charges a
price lower than b. Therefore type e b1(s) strictly prefers to buy at time t rather than
at t + 1 whatever pt+1 t+1. For the same reason he would not buy later on and
therefore bt+1 < e b1(s), a contradiction.
Consider the two-period game. ￿2(p) is nothing else than the (set) of types b that,
given price p, satis￿es43:
b[1 + ￿ 1(b)] ￿ p 2 ￿ [b ￿ b ￿1(b)] 1(b)
which is equivalent to
p 2 b + ￿ 1(b)b ￿1(b) (10)
The right hand side of (10) represents the (net) utility that type b gets from pur-
chasing today if he were the indi⁄erent buyer as a function of next period price
correspondence b ￿1(b) and the probability that there will be no future  1(b).
Any (continuation) strategy of the Seller speci￿es a curve f : [b;be] ! P such that44:
f(b) ￿ b + ￿b ￿1(b) 1(b) 8b (11)
As b ￿1(b) 1(b) is a strictly increasing, compact and convex valued, uhc correspon-
dence then b + ￿b ￿1(b) 1(b) is strongly increasing and uhc. In other words b +
￿b ￿1(b) 1(b) depicts an increasing curve with some vertical but no horizontal traits.
Hence there exists a unique curve that satis￿es property (11) which is invertible;
de￿ne such inverse as f￿1 = ￿2(p). ￿2 is therefore a well de￿ned, non decreasing
function. Notice that 8p < e p1(s), ￿2(p) = ￿1(p) as the right hand side of (10)
collapses to b.
The function ￿2(p) has therefore some "￿ at spots" where increasing the current
price does not reduce the number of buyers as higher prices today are associated
with higher prices tomorrow. Notice moreover that for any pt there exists a unique
pair (b;pt+1 2  1(b)b ￿1(b)) that satis￿es ￿2(pt) = pt ￿ ￿pt+1 and therefore that
the choice of any price pt uniquely determines both the indi⁄erent buyer and the
(expected) next period price.
Recall that e p1(s) ￿ e b1(s) and de￿ne recursivelye bn(s) ￿ fmaxbe 2 R+ : min￿n(be;s) < e pn￿1(s)g
and e pn(s) ￿ e bn(s)+￿ min￿n(e bn;s). Notice that ￿n(pt) < e bn(s) for every pt < e pn(s)
by de￿nition of e pn(s). Suppose that:
43To save notation the argument s is dropped in the following paragraph.
44For instance one strategy (for b ￿ b1) may consist in charging tomorrow the highest price
whatever today￿ s price or: f(b) = b + ￿ maxfb ￿1(b)g 8b
31a. ￿n(pt) = pt ￿ ￿pe
t+1(pt) is a well de￿ned, continuous and non decreasing
function where pe
t+1(pt) 2  n￿1(￿n(pt))b ￿n￿1(￿n(pt)) is the unique solution
to pt ￿ ￿pe
t+1 = ￿n(pt).
b. ￿n￿1(be;s) is continuous and increasing in both be and s.
c. ￿n￿1(be), ￿n￿1(be; e pn￿1(s)) and  n￿1(be) are non empty, compact valued, uhc
and strictly increasing correspondences.
d. For any history ht such that bt < e bn￿1(s), then pt < e pn￿2(s) and shutdown
occurs after at most n ￿ 2 periods of sales with probability one which implies
that ￿￿(Ht) = ￿￿
n￿2(Ht)45.
e. If pt < e pn￿1(s) then bt+1 is necessarily lower thane bn￿1(s) and shutdown occurs
after at most n ￿ 1 periods of sales.
I shall show that the same properties hold for the n-period game.
Consider the problem P(be;￿n;￿n￿1;s;p). Notice that since ￿n is a strictly increas-
ing correspondence then for every bt < e bn(s) any element of ￿n(bt) should be lower
than e pn￿1(s) by de￿nition of e bn(s). If a price pt 2 ￿n(bt) such that pt < e pn￿1(s) is
charged then by inductive hypothesis ￿n￿1 = ￿n￿2, ￿n(p) = ￿n￿1(p) and therefore
pt should also be an element of ￿n￿1(bt).
Lemma 4 For any history ht such that bt < e bn(s), then shutdown occurs after at
most n ￿ 1 periods of sales with probability one.
To see this note that by (e.) it is su¢ cient to show that whenever bt < e bn(s), charging
any price greater or equal than e pn￿1(s) cannot be optimal. Observe that by inductive
hypothesis the seller can always guarantee himself ￿n￿1(bt;s) charging some price
pt < e pn￿1(s) with pt 2 ￿n(bt) and moreover that any other price pt = 2 ￿n(bt) such
that bt+1 < e bn￿1(s) would lead to lower pro￿ts. It remains to be proved that given
any price pt ￿ e pn￿1(s) such that bt+1 ￿ e bn￿1(s) the seller cannot get anything better
or equal. To see this, consider an " such that [F(b + ") ￿ F(b)](b + ")=(1 ￿ ￿) +




and such that b + " < e bn(s).
Consider b = e bn￿1(s) + ". Clearly for every pt is such that bt+1 ￿ e bn￿1(s) the seller
gets at most
h
F(e bn￿1(s) + ") ￿ F(b)
i
(e bn￿1(s) + ")=(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿n￿1(e bn￿1(s);s) less





Lemma 5 If pt < e pn(s) is charged then bt+1 should be necessarily lower than e bn(s).
45For the case n = 2 let p0(s) = b + " be a dummy variable and assume (innocuously) that the
seller is contrained to prices lower than p0 whenever he shut downs (  = 0).
32To prove this result it is su¢ cient to show that type ￿n(pt) < e bn(s) always accepts
any such price. Suppose not. Then it should be that bt+1 ￿ e bn(s). Consider pt+1. By





￿ maxf￿n￿1(￿n(pt))g ￿ pe
t+1(pt). At this price type ￿n(pt) is
"at most" indi⁄erent between buying today at price pt or tomorrow which implies
that all types b > ￿n(pt) strictly prefer to buy today rather than tomorrow (lemma
1) and hence that bt+2 ￿ e bn(s). By the same logic they would not buy later on and
hence they should all buy today at price pt and therefore bt+1 < e bn(s).
Lastly I work backward one period to show that ￿n+1(p) is well de￿ned. The
valuation of a buyer who is just indi⁄erent between paying p and waiting in the
n + 1 period game must satisfy b[1 + ￿ n(b)] ￿ p 2 ￿ [b ￿ b ￿n(b)] n(b) or p 2 b +
￿ n￿1(b)b ￿n￿1(b). Once again as b ￿n(b) n(b) is a strictly increasing, compact and
convex valued, uhc correspondence then b + ￿b ￿n(b) n(b) is strongly increasing and
uhc. Therefore it has a unique, continuous and non decreasing inverse function
￿n(p) = p ￿ ￿pe(p) where pe(p) 2  n(￿n(p))b ￿n(￿n(p)) is the unique solution to
pt ￿ ￿pe = ￿n(pt).
By lemma 1, there always exist a T￿+1 high enough such that bT￿(s) ￿ b < bT￿+1(s)
and the inductive process comes to an endpoint. Since to each ￿rst period choice




i=1 then the equilibrium is unique up to the seller initial
choice. The value of the game is therefore given by ￿T￿(b;s) which is continuous
and increasing in s by inductive hypothesis.
The thresholde bn(s) can be alternatively de￿ned as fmaxbe 2 R+ : ￿n￿1(be;s) ￿ ￿n(be;s)g
and hence interpreted as the threshold that leaves the seller indi⁄erent between an
n-period and an n ￿ 1-period game. The thresholds in corollary 1 are uniquely de-
￿ned by sn =
n
s 2 R+ : e bn(s) = b
o
since e bn(s) is increasing in s. Moreover notice
that sn decreases with n since e bn(s) < e bn+1(s) for every s. For s = sn then the
seller is actually indi⁄erent between charging a price pt 2 ￿n(b) with pt < pn￿1
that results in n ￿ 1 periods of sales and pt 2 ￿n(b) with pn￿1 ￿ pt < pn that
results in n periods of sales. In particular notice that s1 is such that ￿1(b;s1) =
maxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r + ￿s1 = ￿0(b;s1) ￿ s1which is nothing else than the value of the
rental solution ￿fc. Corollary 2 follows from the fact that e b1(s) < b whenever s < s1
and therefore shutdown is a dominated strategy.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
First notice that (ii) ) (i) since the seller can always commit to charge the equilib-
rium prices. (ii)￿ s proof is divided in two parts: 1) analogously to the no-commitment
33case, the optimal precommitment durability weakly decreases with the value of the
outside option and 2) there always exists a positive and small enough ￿ such that for
some values of s, p(s) exceeds the ￿rst period optimal precommitment price whereas
both the precommitment and the equilibrium durability is 2.
(a) If the seller can commit to any durability he wants, the optimal pricing strat-
egy does not depend on s. Let ￿c
0(￿(p);s) = s. De￿ne recursively ￿c
n(b;s) and
pc
n(b) for n 2 f1;2g as respectively the value function and the (unique) solu-
tion of the maximization problem P(b;￿c
n;￿c
n￿1;s;b=(1 ￿ ￿)) where ￿c
1(p) = p and
￿c
2(p) is the unique solution of (2) when p2 = pc
1(￿c








for n 2 f1;2g. The optimal durability weakly
decreases with s if
(i) sc
2;sc




First notice that ￿c
2(p) < p for every p > b which implies that pc
2(b) ￿ pc
1(b) =
argmaxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r > b and therefore that ￿c
2(b;0) ￿ maxp[1 ￿ F(￿c
2(p))]p >
maxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r = ￿c
1(b;0) > ￿c
0(b;0). The latter coupled with the fact that
@￿c
n(b;s)=s = ￿n < 1 implies (i). Let Jc
n(b) denote the "value of sales" of the
n-period game, that is ￿c
n(b;s) ￿ ￿ns. Showing that sc
2 is strictly less than sc
1 is
equivalent to show that Jc
2(b) < Jc
1(b)(1 + ￿) since sc
2 = (Jc
2 ￿ Jc
1)=￿(1 ￿ ￿) and
sc
1 = Jc
1=(1 ￿ ￿). That the latter holds follows from the fact that Jc
1(b)(1 + ￿) is
equal to the full commitment payo⁄ which should be necessarily greater than the
no commitment one under the assumption that maxr[1 ￿ F(r)]r > b.
(b) Since it is more convenient to work with marginal buyers rather than prices let
bc




be the optimal precommitment indi⁄erent buyers which are unique by assumption.
Recall that 8s 2 [0;sc
2) the seller strictly prefers a two period game (and hence
chooses bc
2(b)) rather than a one period game. This implies, by a straightforward
revealed preference argument, that the seller would do so even when he cannot
resort to any commitment device. But since e b(s) increases with s, if e b(s) = bc
2(b) for
some s < sc
2 then the seller cannot replicate the commitment solution in some open
neighborhood of sc
2. e b(s) = bc









(￿ sa in ￿gure 2￿ s notation). The issue is to ￿nd conditions under which the latter
expression is lower than sc
2 and therefore conditions under which the seller cannot
34replicate the commitment solution for some s < sc
2. Recall that sc



















I want to ￿nd conditions on ￿ such that sc














From the de￿nition of bc
2(b) notice that if ￿ = 0 then bc
2(b) = bc
1(b) (the two period
game coincides with the one period game since there is no future) and hence at ￿ = 0
condition (13) is not satis￿ed. Using the fact that 1+￿bc0
1 (bc
2(b)) ￿ ￿ is equal to one
when ￿ = 0, it follows that the derivative of the left hand side of (13) calculated in









































2(b)) denotes the derivative of the inverse of the hazard rate of the
distribution calculated in bc



















which implies that, for any distribution F, condition (13) is always satis￿ed for some
￿ close enough to zero. Lastly it remains to show that sa < s2. To see this recall that
the equilibrium pro￿ts ￿(b;s) are continuous in s by proposition 2 which together
with the fact ￿(b;sa) = ￿c
2(b;sa) > ￿c
1(b;sa) necessarily imply that there exists an
open, non empty subset of R+ such that the equilibrium durability is two and the
seller charges higher than precommitment prices in both periods.
A (formal) proof of (iii) is omitted and replaced by the following observation. When
s 2 (sa;s2) the seller reacts to a marginal increase in the shutdown reward with a
supply contraction to preserve his ex-post incentives to stay on the market. In
other words the seller maximizes his discounted pro￿ts subject to an intertemporal
constraint. Ceteris paribus, the (shadow) cost of shifting buyers and thus revenues
from today to future periods is higher the lower the discount factor as part of this
35revenues come back under the form of discounted pro￿ts46. Given this observation it
is straightforward to show that there always exists a low enough ￿ such that pro￿ts
decrease with the shutdown reward.
E. Proof of Theorem 1
A history in period t is a sequence of prices, a sequence of innovations and a sequence
of purchases by consumers. Since the equilibrium pro￿les of each cycle are uniquely47
determined, through a dominance argument, by the (expected) continuation value of
the game after an innovation takes place (proposition 2) then one can Wlog restrict
attention to continuation pro￿les that depend only on events that occurred since
this particular cycle begun. Given any sequence of continuation values fse
￿g￿ such
that (a) and (b) are satis￿ed, where ￿ = 1;2;::; indexes the innovations, it is always
possible to construct at least an equilibrium. Consider the ￿rst order autonomous
system:
se
￿ + c = ￿(￿;se
￿+1) (14)
That any ￿xed point of ￿(￿;s) ￿ c is a stationary equilibrium follows by de￿nition.
Since ￿ is continuous, ￿(￿;0) > 0 and @￿(￿;se)=@se < 1 (whenever it exists) then a
￿xed point s￿ necessarily exists and is unique for any c 2 [0;￿(￿;0)] by Brouwer￿ s
theorem. For c < ￿(￿;0), s￿ > 0 and entry occurs with probability one.
In addition to ￿xed points, such dynamic system may make it possible the emergence
of some phenomena, such as cyclical or converging patterns, that maybe rooted into
equilibrium behavior. Consider the boundary-value problem given by (14) and any
initial condition se
1 and de￿ne a (particular) solution trajectory as any sequence
fse
igi generated through (14). We are interested both in the asymptotic behavior
of such trajectories (convergence towards a limit point or a limit orbit) and in the
convergence process, if any, because any such trajectory that satis￿es (a) and (b)
constitutes another (non-stationary) equilibrium of the game. Because ￿ maybe not
monotonically increasing then the inverse mapping ￿￿1 may well be a correspon-
dence, so solution trajectories obtained through (14) may not be unique. However
if j@￿(￿;se
￿+1)=@sj < 1 then e ￿, de￿ned as the unique continuous selection of ￿, is a
contraction mapping (and hence (e ￿￿c)￿1 is not). Therefore any solution trajectory
generated through (14) from some se
1 6= s￿ either diverges away or is mapped to
zero. c < ￿(￿;0) guarantees that any trajectory that passes trough zero is mapped
outside the domain. [Author cite here] extends corollary 3 to the case where no
46Formally the seller program is given by: maxx a(x)+b(x)￿ +￿
2s s.t. b(x)+￿s = s. with b
0 > 0
and a
0 < 0 at the optimum:
47Recall that the equilibrium is unique "up to the seller initial choice" . Yet conditioning such
initial choice over history won￿ t change anything since the value of the game is constant over any
such initial choice.
36restrictions are imposed to deal with the s = 0 case.
F. Proof of Proposition 4 and 5
If c = 0, (4) becomes ￿(￿;s￿) = s￿ which is true i⁄ s￿ =
[1￿F(r￿)]r￿
1￿￿ where r￿ is the
rental solution (see the proof of proposition 1 for details). Uniqueness comes from
the fact that for s 2 (s2;s￿] (i.e. for c low enough) the seller innovates every period
hence ￿0
s = ￿ > 0.
Di⁄erentiating (4) yields @￿(￿;c)=@c = ￿[1 ￿ ￿0
s(￿;￿(￿;c))]
￿1 < 0 since ￿0
s is
bounded from above by 1. (ii),(iii),(iv) and (v) follow straightforwardly from propo-
sition 3.
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